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The Effects of Strikes and Strike Length 
on Negotiated Wage Settlements 
Craig W. Riddell 
This study investigates the effects of strikes and strike length on 
negotiated wage settlements in Canada using a large body of individual con-
tract data. The main novelty of the paper is the inclusion of both a strike/no 
strike dummy variable and the length of the strike if one occurred in an 
équation explaining wage changes. This allows for the possibility (and thus 
tests the hypothesis) that the occurrence or non occurrence of a strike and 
the length of the strike if one occurred hâve separate effects on the 
negotiated settlement. 
A number of previous studies hâve included a strike or strike activity 
variable in the wage équation. Thèse studies can be divided into two types: 
those using an aggregate wage index to form the dépendent variable and 
those using individual contract data. In the first type the strike activity 
variable (e.g. number of strikes during the period or man-days lost due to 
strikes) is usually interpreted as a measure of trade union militancy. Ex-
amples include Ashenfelter, Johnson and Pencavel (1972), Godfrey (1971), 
Godfrey and Taylor (1973), Johnston and Timbrell (1973) and Swidinsky 
(1972). Thèse studies generally find that the strike activity variable has a 
positive effect on wage changes. In studies employing individual contract 
data the hypothesis tested is that settlements involving a strike differ in their 
déterminants from settlements not involving a strike. This differs from the 
aggregative studies which implicitly if not explicitly hypothesize that ail 
wage changes during a period of high strike activity are a certain amount 
higher than they would otherwise hâve been rather than simply those set-
tlements involving a strike. Examples of this second type of study include 
Sparks and Wilton (1971), Mills (1971) and Cousineau and Lacroix (1977). 
The studies using individual contract data generally find that the strike 
dummy is significant and has a positive sign. The Sparks and Wilton (1971) 
and Mills (1971) studies (the latter was a cross section while the former a 
pooled time séries cross section) obtained strike dummy coefficients of 
about one, indicating that settlements involving a strike are about one per-
cent higher, other things equal, than non-strike settlements. Cousineau and 
Lacroix (1977) obtained a coefficient of just over one-half; they also found 
that the coefficient was smaller (0.34) and not significantly greater than zéro 
(at the five percent level) when the transportation, communication and 
utilities sector was excluded. 
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Two points should be noted about the relationship between thèse two 
types of studies. First, as suggested above, aggregative studies are based on 
the hypothesis that 'union militancy' or 'trade union pressure' varies from 
period to period and has a positive effect on ail wage changes negotiated 
during the period; strike activity is simply a proxy for trade union pressure. 
The individual contract studies are not based on any notion of strike activity 
being a proxy for trade union pressure, but are based on the hypothesis that 
settlements involving a strike differ from other settlements. Second, if set-
tlements involving a strike resuit in a higher wage change than those not in-
volving a strike then periods in which an above average number of strikes 
occur will hâve an unusually high (given other économie conditions) percen-
tage change in the aggregate wage index so that it will appear that trade 
union militancy (as measured by strike activity) is having a positive effect on 
wage settlements even though that may not be the case. On the other hand, 
even if individual settlements involving strikes do not differ in any way 
from those not involving strikes (so that the strike dummy in the individual 
contract studies is insignificant) it may still be true that strike activity has a 
significant effect on the overall percentage change in wages. 
This study belongs to the second group in that individual contract data 
is employed, and the hypothesis to be tested is that settlements involving a 
strike differ from other settlements. Besides obtaining additional évidence 
which tends to support the findings of the other studies based on individual 
contracts, the study is the first to include both a strike dummy variable and 
a variable measuring the duration of the strike (this is zéro if no strike oc-
curred)1. The rationale for doing this is that some théories of the bargaining 
process (thèse are discussed more fully below) place considérable emphasis 
on the rate at which workers' demands or expectations décline and /or the 
rate at which the firm's offer rises as the length of the work stoppage in-
creases. While it may not provide a définitive test, évidence on how the 
negotiated wage change is affected by the length of the strike, given that a 
strike in fact occurred, will clearly be of some relevance to thèse théories. 
Many solutions to the bargaining problem (see, e.g., the survey in 
chapter two of de Menil (1971) are inconsistent with the occurrence of 
strikes in that the nature of the problem implies a certain 'pie' to be divided 
between the two players and a strike of any duration reduces the size of the 
pie thus harming both sides. This outcome is inconsistent with the kinds of 
rationality postulâtes which underlie the theory which provides the solution 
in the first place. According to thèse théories, strikes only occur because of 
'irrationality', communication failures or miscalculations of the other side's 
intentions. If thèse are the major factors accounting for strikes, then it is 
not at ail clear that there should be any significant relationship between the 
occurrence of a strike and the final wage settlement. For example, if the 
strike occurs because of miscalculations based on lack of information about 
the other side's true intentions, then the strike period is one in which inap-
propriate views or information becomes amended, and the final settlement 
i COUSINEAU and LACROIX use the strike dummy and the duration of the strike as 
alternative strike variables. 
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will be, on average, no différent from one not involving a strike. A useful 
discussion of this line of argument is contained in Cousineau and Lacroix 
(1977, chapter 6). 
A leading theory explaining the occurrence of strikes and the joint 
détermination of the wage rate is that of Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969). 
This theory follows Ross (1948) in emphasizing that the union leaders and 
union members are distinct groups with (at times) differing objectives. 
Union leaders gather information about the expectations of the workers, 
but they also hâve much better information about the firm's ability to pay 
than do the workers. When the worker's expectations are higher than the 
final wage settlement which can be realistically be expected, the union 
leadership faces a dilemma. They can either agrée to this 'realistic' wage and 
benefits package which has the appearance of 'giving in' to the firm's offer 
or they call for a strike which has the function of reducing the workers' ex-
pectations until they coincide with what the firm is willing or able to pay at 
which time a settlement is reached. More specifically, there is a 'concession 
schedule' which describes the rate at which the workers' expectations 
décline as the duration of the strike increases. The firm is faced with this 
schedule and chooses the strike duration (which may be zéro in which case 
the firm meets the worker's initial demands) and therefore settlement wage 
which maximizes the firm's net présent value. The trade-off is that a longer 
strike means greater losses of profits during the strike which lowers net pré-
sent value but also means a lower final wage which raises net présent value. 
The main difficulties with this approach would appear to be its reliance 
on rather unsophisticated worker behavior and its one-sided nature. With 
respect to the latter it could be argued to be equally plausible, as Eaton 
(1972) has suggested, for the workers to take the firm's concession schedule 
as given and to pick the optimal (utility maximizing) strike duration, trading 
off the loss in présent income from a longer strike against the gain in future 
income due to the firm's concessions. 
Of course, a more gênerai theory would involve concession schedules 
on both sides, with both parties having imperfect information about the 
other's intentions. Unfortunately it is very difficult to generate testable im-
plications with such a model (see, e.g., Rabinovitch and Swary (1976)). 
Thus it may be necessary to choose between a model in which, as in 
Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969), the firm chooses the strike length and one 
in which, as in Eaton (1972) and Swidinsky (1972) the workers choose the 
strike length in order to avoid a theory in which 'anything can happen'. Fur-
ther, because of the large number of possibilities which can occur, at least in 
principle, in a bargaining situation there is a need for incorporating as much 
empirical content as possible into bargaining théories in order to obtain 
refutable prédictions. This is part of the motivation behind this paper. In 
particular, it is suggested that if the Ashenfelter and Johnson theory is cor-
rect then we should observe, other things equal, a négative relationship bet-
ween the negotiated wage change and the length of the strike, while if the 
firm's concession rate tends to dominate that of the workers so that the 
Eaton type of model is more appropriate we should observe, other things 
held constant, a positive relationship between the wage settlement and the 
duration of the strike. 
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The empirical results reported in Table 1 tend to support the latter of 
thèse two théories, and therefore suggest that the view of the workers 
deciding whether or not to strike and on the length of strike given a conces-
sion schedule for the firm tends to be more descriptive of bargaining situa-
tions than that in which the firm is cast in this rôle. Columns 1 and 3 report 
régression équations estimated without the strike dummy (STRIKE) and the 
length of the strike in days (DAYS) while columns 2 and 4 report the same 
équations when thèse two variables are included. Both the strike and length 
of strike variables are significant and positive. The size of the coefficients 
make the results comparable to those of Sparks and Wilton. 
TABLE 1 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant -2.01 -1.97 -0.50 -0.50 
(-6.8) (-6.7) (-1.7) (-1.7) 
u-1 26.53 26.22 16.39 16.39 (21.9) (21.7) (12.5) (12.6) 
AU 0.79 0.79 0.56 0.56 
(13.7) (13.5) (9.7) (9.8) 
PE 1.67 1.64 1.63 1.61 
(34.8) (33.7) (33.4) (33.0) 
CATCH 0.26 
(8.3) 
0.14 
(7.9) 
STRIKE 0.86 
(2.2) 
0.87 
(2.4) 
DAYS 0.019 
(2.2) (1.9) 
0.015 
R2 0.36 0.37 0.43 0.44 
Figures in parenthèse are t statistics. 
Since this paper represents a small extension of a larger study reported 
in Riddell (1979), there is not much need to give détails of the other 
variables and their construction, the sample, etc. The following brief 
remarks will suffice. The sample covers the period 1953 to 1973 and in-
cludes 2360 contracts from 18 Canadiari 3 digit level industries, mostly 
manufacturing. The dépendent variable is the annualized percentage in-
crease in the base wage rate over the life of the agreement. Incréments oc-
curring early in the contract are weighted more heavily than those occurring 
in the second or third years. The explanatory variables are a constant term, 
the inverse of the national unemployment rate in the month in which the 
contract was signed (U"1), the change in the unemployment rate over the 
previous six months (AU) and the expected rate of inflation at the time the 
contract was signed (PE). Equations (1) and (2) employ thèse variables and 
are based on the full sample of 2360 contracts. A catch-up variable 
(CATCH), measured as the différence between the expected rate of infla-
THE EFFECTS OF STRIKES AND STRIKE LENGTH ON NEGOTIATED WAGE SETTLEMENTS 119 
tion at the time the previous contract was signed and the actual rate over the 
previous contract times (i.e. the différence times) the length of the previous 
contract in months, is included in équations (3) and (4). Thèse équations are 
based on 2284 contracts covering the period mid-1953 to 1973. (Contracts in 
the first half of 1953 had to be dropped because there is no recorded 
previous contract on which to calculate the catch-up variable). Ail of the 
variables hâve the predicted (or at least expected) signs. The U~* coefficient 
indicates a fairly steep short-run Phillips curve, and the positive sign on AU 
implies clockwise loops around the Phillips curve. The PE coefficient is 
rather large compared to the predicted value of unity; this finding is ex-
amined in Riddell (1979). The positive sign on CATCH indicates that if in-
flation is higher than was expected, then the subséquent wage seulement 
will be higher than it would otherwise hâve been. 
In summary, the results shown in Table 1 indicate that both the occur-
rence of a strike and the length of the strike affect the negotiated wage 
change, after controlling for économie conditions (expected inflation, the 
state of excess demand in the labour market, etc). The positive sign on the 
length of strike variable is much easier to reconcile with the view that the 
firm's concession rate tends to dominate that of the workers than with the 
Ashenfelter-Johnson view of the bargaining process. The positive coeffi-
cient on the STRIKE variable tends to confirm the findings of other studies 
which indicate that settlements involving a strike resuit in wage changes that 
are one-half to one percent higher than would otherwise be the case. 
Three comments should be made concerning the assessment of thèse 
empirical results. First, there are several important reasons to prefer results 
based on individual contract data over those based on wage or earnings in-
dex data; thèse are discussed by Hamermesh (1970) and Riddell (1979) 
among others. Second, if, as indicated by our results, strikes resuit in higher 
settlements than would otherwise hâve occurred and if thèse settlements 
'spill over' and affect subséquent non-strike settlements (perhaps mainly 
those in the same région or same industry) then the effects of strikes as 
estimated in Table 1 will be understated. Third, it could be argued that the 
entire parameter vector associated with strike settlements will differ from 
that associated with non-strike settlements rather than just the constant 
term differing (which is the maintained hypothesis when a strike dummy 
variable is used). This more gênerai spécification is employed by Auld et al. 
(1978); it could not be employed hère because the number of settlements in-
volving a strike was too small to permit a separate équation to be usefully 
estimated; further, it is not clear how to incorporate strike length in this 
spécification as the argument for différent déterminants of strike and non-
strike settlements applies equally well to settlements involving strikes of dif-
férent durations. 
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